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The evolution of the law governing peacebuilding 
in post conflict countries is a key feature in 
global and United Nations efforts to maintain 
peace and security. As the President of the 
Security Council stated in 1998 “post conflict 
peace building structures [are] part of efforts by 
the United Nations system to achieve a lasting 
peaceful solution to conflicts”.1 This idea has been 
reiterated in subsequent UN documents, such as 
the Brahimi Report2 and the more recent “United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines”.3 
However, the legal framework and political strategies for peacebuilding are far 
from being precisely defined in international law and international relations. 
The practice has shown some successful cases and other situations which 
presented, and are actually presenting, serious difficulties. In most of these 
situations, the process of peacebuilding is challenging and this is reflected in 
the mandates of the missions set up by international organizations and deployed 
in post conflict countries. The new trend in peacekeeping strategy is to focus 
more and more on the creation of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. 
International troops are not only mandated with typical peacekeeping functions 
but also with reconstruction and social tasks. In this regard, the reform of the 
justice sector plays a key role along with respect for human rights and security 
issues. In various scenarios the reform of justice has determined the success 
of the entire reconstruction strategy. 
The book by Matteo Tondini deals with such a complex issue and specifically 
with justice sector reform in Afghanistan. It is a meritorious work of 
reconstruction of the fragmented involvement of national and international 
actors in the process of peacebuilding in that country. The case study of 
1 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/38, 28 
December 1998.
2 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305 - 
S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
3 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field 
Support, 2008, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/
Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
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Afghanistan is one of the most interesting ones and gives the chance to explore 
and criticize the legal foundations of reforms in post conflict scenarios. Given 
the absence of a direct involvement of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, 
justice sector reform in Afghanistan has been followed up by a plethora of 
actors. The coordination of those entities has experienced some difficulties 
and the capacity building of the local actors has not always been successful. 
However, as reported by the author, there is room for improving the current 
situation and some important results have been achieved. 
The book is composed of five chapters. While the first two are aimed at 
introducing the legal framework and the political strategies of peacebuilding in 
general and in the specific case of Afghanistan, the last three parts are dedicated 
to reform of the justice sector in that State. In this regard the author looks at 
the evolution of the justice system in Afghanistan starting from the adoption 
of the first constitution in 1923 and focusing on the situation prior to 9/11.
In the first chapter the author sets out the new approach to peacebuilding after 
the 9/11 attacks in 2001. There is a marked difference between the paradigm 
of statebuilding before and after that date. The author takes as examples of 
the former period the UN territorial administrations in East Slavonia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo and East Timor and defines the powers of the international actors 
involved as: “so extensive that the status of the administrated territories 
resembled that of a protectorate or a trusteeship administration”. After 9/11, 
the “local ownership” (or national ownership) has become the new strategy to 
improve the institutional reforms processes. This new approach is guided by 
the idea that peacebuilding should be based on the reinforcement of the local 
capacity and of the domestic decision making.  
The second chapter of the book is dedicated to the so called “consent based 
approach” in the reform of justice. Here the author again points out a difference 
between the approach followed in the territories administered by international 
actors and the situation in Afghanistan. He demonstrates that the previous 
approach (‘neo-colonialist’) consists in the arrangement of “justice packages” 
aimed at the reconstruction of the justice sector of post conflict States through 
the deployment of legal experts and the pre-arrangement of the applicable 
norms. The “consent based approach” illustrated in this part of the book is 
much more aimed at looking for consensus in order to respond to the local 
demand for justice. As an example of this approach, the experience of tribal 
justice is shown, which is currently fostered in Afghanistan and which has been 
successfully employed in Rwanda through the Gacaca Courts.
The system of justice in Afghanistan before the US intervention is presented in 
the third part of the book. It describes well how the Taliban regime, which took 
power in 1996 after the communist period and after the arrival of Mujahedins 
in 1992 and the correspondent period of Islamization, has modified the 
institutional framework. The Taliban regime brought the things back as they 
were before 1978. The judiciary was essentially composed of Shariat court with 
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limited powers and jurisdiction. In fact, the establishment of ad hoc religious 
courts to hear specific cases has been very frequent. The author concludes 
that the justice system was “completely in the hands of local actors” and that 
“it had never been considered as fair and impartial by the local population”.
In the fourth part of the book it is shown how the “lead nation approach” 
contributed at first to the restoration of the justice system. The Bonn Agreement 
declared that until the adoption of a new constitution, the interim legal system 
in force in Afghanistan consisted of the 1964 Constitution. Furthermore, the 
Interim Administration created the Judicial Reform Commission in 2002 which 
identified a list of priorities for the justice sector. During this first period, Italy 
was named as the lead nation for the justice sector reform. Italy focused on 
the legislative reform, the training and capacity building and the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure. Particularly interesting is the approach followed by Italy, 
with a strong presence of international actors. The role of Italy in this regard 
is analysed by the author, who reflects on the choice by Italy to involve other 
international actors. Tondini sees the presence of multiple actors as a factor 
of confusion for the local institutions. It is also described that the initial phase 
was followed by the adoption of the 2004 Constitution, which drew up a new 
justice system consisting of the judiciary (Supreme Court, court of appeals and 
primary courts), the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice.
The fifth part of the book describes the second phase of reconstruction, 
identifiable with the end of the Bonn process and the London conference. 
According to the author, in this phase of the reconstruction a gradual hand 
over to the Afghan Government of all the competencies in the field of justice 
reform is recognizable. It is illustrated the National Justice Programme set 
up within the National Justice Sector Strategy, established during the Rome 
Conference on the rule of law in Afghanistan held in 2007. Moreover, he 
describes reform activities in three sector: counter-narcotics law, training and 
capacity building and judicial infrastructure. He also explains how the US 
military has been more and more involved in the reform of justice. The author 
concludes by defining this phase as a “mixed ownership regime” in which 
the Afghan Government retained a major role in the reform of justice which 
was also open to the intervention of international actors. This was the case of 
European Union legal advisors working with the Afghan justice institutions.
The author concludes his book with some reflections and proposals. The 
conclusions drawn by Tondini focus on the international involvement and the 
on the strategies of the actors involved. He presents the necessity to reduce the 
number of international actors involved in the process of justice reform. This 
certainly derives from the need to put into practice the “national ownership” 
doctrine and also from the necessity to avoid confusion on the field and to 
improve coordination. Moreover, it is interesting that the author suggests 
to reduce the number of bilateral activities, such as legal training: this is a 
reference to the strategy adopted by Italy as the lead nation in the reform of 
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justice. Furthermore, one last interesting conclusion regards the future: the 
author notes that it is not useful to implement “those reform activities which 
mostly aim at copying with the short-term interests of donors rather than at 
shaping a modern and effective justice system”.
This book raises some interesting points that deserve to be analyzed. I would like 
to focus mainly on two aspects, one general and the second more specific. The 
first point regards the “national ownership” that Tondini fostered in a previous 
article where he mentions the so called “light footprint approach”.4 I would like 
to start by mentioning a renewal in the United Nations peacebuilding strategy 
even if the UN are not involved in the reform of justice in Afghanistan. The 
new UN strategy, in fact, stresses some important principles that are useful to 
understand and to improve peacebuilding even if the UN is not actually involved.
On 29 October 2010, the Security Council approved Resolution 1947 in which 
it reaffirmed the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission “as a dedicated 
intergovernmental advisory body to address the needs of countries emerging 
from conflict towards sustainable peace”.5 The occasion for a re-affirmation 
of the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission was the approval of the 
report “Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture”6 (hereinafter 
‘Review’). A similar Resolution was also adopted on the same day at the 40th 
Meeting of the Sixty-fifth General Assembly plenary session.7  
The Peacebuilding Commission was established as an outgrowth of the 
General Assembly’s 2005 World Summit. It is charged with helping post-
conflict countries in their recovery, reconstruction and development efforts. 
The countries on its agenda include Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. At the time it was set up, the Commission - 
an intergovernmental body mandated to foster coordination among key actors 
on the ground and to bring together resources for post-conflict countries - was 
hailed as a milestone. It was created as part of a broader United Nations 
peacebuilding architecture that includes the Peacebuilding Support Office and 
a multi-donor facility.
The idea of peacebuilding, however, is not a totally new one. The so called 
second generation peacekeeping operations are to be considered a practical 
mise en ouvre of peacebuilding in the much broader sector of the maintenance 
of international peace and security. In the 1990s and since the United Nations 
mission in Namibia (UNTAG), peacebuilding activities have become a key 
element of peacekeeping operations.8 Moreover, peacebuilding has been seen 
4 M. Tondini, ‘From Neo-Colonialism to a “Ligh-Footprint Approach”: Restoring 
Justice Systems’, Vol. 15 International Peacekeeping 2008, pp. 237-251.
5 UNSC Res. 1947, 29 October 2010.
6 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc. 
A/64/868-S/2010/393, 21 July 2010, hereinafter ‘Review’.
7 UNGA Res. 65/7, 29 October 2010.
8 N. Schrijver, ‘Introducing Second Generation Peacekeeping: the Case of Namibia’, 
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as one the most successful attempt in the whole United Nations efforts in 
maintaining peace and security.9
However, there was a “key institutional gap”10 in the United Nations system 
as no organ was devoted to the promotion of peacebuilding. The creation of 
the Peacebuilding Commission created such an organ.
The Peacebuilding Commission has experienced some problems in perform 
effectively its work. More expressly, the new Report adopted by the 
Peacebuilding Commission on 21 July 2010 admits that, despite the great 
enthusiasm which welcomed the institution of the new organ, the Peacebuilding 
Commission has never reached the threshold of success that was hoped.11
The Review identifies six key issues and concerns which are crucial for the 
future evolution of peacebuilding: 1) the complexity of peacebuilding, 2) the 
imperative of national ownership, 3) the illusion of sequencing, 4) urgency 
of resource mobilization, 5) women’s contribution, and 6) connection with 
the field. 
It seems that the second of these points regards an issue which is central in the 
book by Tondini. The Review suggests that the Peacebuilding Commission: 
“needs to ensure that national ownership genuinely and comprehensively 
underpins its work”.12 The theory of “national ownership” implies that “the 
international community must understand the limits of its role as midwife to 
a national birthing process”.13 This concept has also been emphasized during 
the discussions at the General Assembly where the Croatian representative 
stressed the need to take “national ownership” as a basis for every process of 
peacebuilding. Such an idea is not a new one, but needs to move from theory to 
practice. In order to improve the practical mise en ouvre of “national ownership” 
the Review suggests to link this concept with the capacity of the local actors 
to “fully engage throughout all phases of planning and implementation”.14 In 
the absence of a strict connection between ownership and capacity, the former 
remains mere theory.
The “national ownership” theorized in the Review reflects among other 
examples the evolution of the justice reform in Afghanistan as reported in 
the book by Tondini. This includes the Consultative Groups where national 
and international stakeholders, chaired by the local Government, participate 
in the policy making. Moreover, even at a lower level, sector working groups 
Vol. 6 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1994, p. 1.
9 E. Bertram, ‘Reinventing Governments: the Promise and Perils of United Nations 
Peacekeeping’, Vol. 39 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1995, pp. 388 and 390.
10 G. Thallinger, ‘The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional Justice’, Vol. 
8 German Law Review 2007, p. 682.
11 Review, § 10.
12 Review, § 19.
13 Review, § 18.
14 Review, § 52.
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are equally composed by national and international actors under the chair of 
the national Government.
Furthermore, and specifically on the reform of justice, the case of Afghanistan, 
as explained by Tondini, seems to give effect to the “national ownership” 
by generating a strong demand for legal and judicial services. Such an 
ambitious objective could be reached by adapting the justice system to the 
local conditions. This is the case of transnational justice and of those judicial 
mechanisms based on local tradition and created in post conflict countries. In 
his book Tondini concluded that this is not really the case for Afghanistan as 
the “action plan” launched in 2006 is actually far from being implemented.
Some kind of scepticism with regard to the implementation of the “national 
ownership” in Afghanistan emerges from the second part of the book where the 
author analyses the recent developments of the reforms in Afghanistan referring 
to them as a “mixed ownership” regime. Tondini points out that although 
the structure is certainly modelled on the “national ownership” principle, in 
Afghanistan, the strong presence of international actors and donors de facto 
impedes the strengthening of the local institutions. Moreover, the author 
also indicates that the “lead nation approach” is not that appropriate. In this 
regard, it can be added that a major coordination between international actors 
should be preferable. Speaking of coordination, the UN Review on the new 
peacebuilding architecture must be recalled again. In that document it is said 
that “improving coordination in the field is vital”15 and that it is important for 
all the international actors involved in peacebuilding to maintain coherence in 
the field.16 In the future, the role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission should 
be devoted to ensure coordination and coherence, with the involvement of the 
whole “UN family”. The suggestions made by the UN are difficult to conciliate 
with the “lead nation approach” which has proved to be problematic in the 
specific case of Afghanistan where Italy, the “lead nation” for the reform of 
the justice sector has involved a huge number of other international actors. 
Such a situation can be seen, as Tondini points out in the book, as an obstacle 
to a complete process of devolution of powers to the local authorities. In this 
regard the analysis proposed by the author seems to be in line with the UN 
proposal for a better coordination in the field.
One last point that could be interesting is the contradiction expressed by those 
Islamic laws which are not compatible with universally recognized human 
rights laws. Tondini explains that such a contradiction derives from the need 
of a balance between the Afghan traditions and externally generated laws 
introduced into the domestic legal system. With regard to this contradiction 
it is interesting to note the institution of the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission (AIHRC) which has become a constitutional organ. The 
Commission may receive individual complaints regarding human rights abuses 
15 Review, § 137.
16 Review, § 58.
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and thus seems to be a guarantee for the respect of human rights. However, 
the AIHRC has no binding powers and it can only refer cases to judicial 
authorities or give assistance to victims of violations of human rights. The 
need of a stronger role for the AIHRC is envisaged in the Strategic Action 
Plan issued by the same Commission in 2010.17 The institution of AIHRC is 
important and meritorious but it should play a more central role in the process 
of justice reform in Afghanistan. 
Concerning human rights it is also to be noted that after the adoption of the 
2004 Constitution the death penalty is still a legal punishment. As the author 
correctly points out, this is in line with the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights but, probably, it is not in line with the trend in international 
law to abolish the death penalty.18 It seems that the necessity of an approval 
of the Afghan President in cases of capital punishments represents rather a 
mere political than a judicial guarantee. In the case of death penalty and in 
other cases where Afghan traditional laws clash with generally recognized 
human rights principle, a stronger intervention by the international actors in 
the modification of those laws could be preferable.    
In conclusion, the book by Matteo Tondini offers an interesting overview of 
the principles governing the justice sector reform in Afghanistan and of the 
concerns that such a long process has been raising since its very beginning. 
While important results have been achieved, other objectives are still to be 
reached. Having regard to the future developments, the suggestions put forward 
by the United Nations in renewing its peacebuilding architecture are to be taken 
into account as they seem to be shaped also on the basis of the experience of 
Afghanistan. In this regard, the conclusions and the suggestions proposed by 
the author are compatible with the new UN peacebuilding architecture.    
Andrea Spagnolo, PhD Candidate in International Law, 
University of Milan, Italy
17 AIHRC, First Quarterly Report, 1389, March-June 2010, http://www.aihrc.org.
af/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/First%201389%20Quarterly%20Report%20
%28English%29.pdf 
18 See for instance the UN General Assembly Resolution on a Moratorium on the use 
of death penalty. UNGA Res. A/C.3/62/L.29, 1 November 2007.
